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URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c10083I recall attending a conference on education in Washington, D.C. in 1994
that was attended by leading policymakers and expert researchers. At that
time, the topic of school choice occupied only a small share of the discus-
sion, and I was the only economist presenting research related to choice.
In fact, although economist Milton Friedman is generally credited with
spurring modern interest in school choice,1 economists were contributing
relatively little to the school choice debate at the time. The two practical
choice proposals that were best known were authored by, respectively, a
sociologist, Christopher Jencks, and two legal scholars, John Coons and
Stephen Sugarman.2 A few programs with choice features had recently
been enacted (vouchers in Milwaukee, Minnesota’s open enrollment plan,
intradistrict choice in Cambridge, and so on), but these programs had been
initiated by politicians and courts with at least as much of an eye to politics
(especially racial politics) as to school improvement. Moreover, analysis of
school choice was largely out of the hands of economists. If a policymaker
asked for research on choice, he was likely to be referred to work by a po-
litical scientist—for instance, John Witte’s comparison of Milwaukee’s
voucher students to Milwaukee public school students (see, e.g., Witte
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Coons and Sugarman (1978).RAND researchers (none of whom was an economist),3or legal scholarship
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In the years since 1994, the economic analysis of school choice has bur-
geoned. As economists have worked on choice, their areas of ignorance and
confusion have narrowed enormously, and their discussion has become
much more coherent. Perhaps this will be a surprise to the outside observer,
who assumes that economists always disagree. However, the rapid growth
in economists’ understanding of school choice should really be no surprise.
At its core, school choice relies on very basic economic theory about the
eﬀects of competition. Moreover, the tools needed for analyzing the more
complex aspects of choice were at hand in 1994. They had been built for re-
lated economic problems and could be applied readily to school choice.
It would be optimistic to suggest that economists fully understand school
choice and agree about all its intricacies. Nevertheless, there is now a con-
sensus about what we know (and do not know) and about the sorts of evi-
dence and analysis that we need in order to resolve uncertainties. This vol-
ume is a testament to the rapid growth of that consensus and to the richness
of the economic analysis of school choice. Not only do the authors repre-
sent a good share of the economists who have written on choice, but each
chapter was subjected to expert critique by other economists and authori-
ties who work on the topic: Joseph Altonji, John Chubb, Chester Finn, Jane
Hannaway, Thomas Kane, Helen Ladd, Charles Manski, Richard Mur-
nane, Derek Neal, and Ananth Seshadri. The authors are very grateful for
their comments and wish to acknowledge how they have shaped the book.
Why the Economics of School Choice?
What does it mean to perform an economic analysis of school choice? It
does not mean that the authors in this volume are interested only in the ﬁ-
nancial aspects of school choice. The authors are deeply interested in (and
analyze) many nonﬁnancial aspects of choice, including student achieve-
ment, parental satisfaction, school segregation, mainstreaming of disabled
children, and parents’ choice of where to live. What it does mean is that the
authors rely on methods that were originally developed for the purpose of
economic analysis. (In fact, when I refer to “economists,” I refer to people
who practice such methods—thereby including some people who are not
card-carrying economists.)
Perhaps this statement will leave readers still in doubt. Why, they will ask,
should we think that economists are naturals when it comes to school
choice? After all, learning the institutional details of elementary and sec-
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who wants to make important contributions on school choice had better
know what actually goes on in schools. There are also legal issues associated
with school choice, and economists are generally not experts in school law.
Economists do have some learning to do when they take up the topic. Nev-
ertheless, economists are naturals in several other, arguably much more im-
portant, ways.
An Unabashed Apologia for The Economics of School Choice
I would argue that there is a simple reason why economists have made
and will continue to make so much progress on school choice: tools. In a
typical discussion of school choice, a variety of questions arise. Answering
these questions generally requires the use of some analytic tools that are not
necessarily complicated but that do require practice if they are to be used
eﬀectively. I will elaborate on these tools below. For now, all we need to
know is that, when the school choice problem fell into the laps of policy an-
alysts, economists were unusually well equipped to start answering the
questions that arose. As a consequence, economists quickly got immersed
in practical tasks, unraveling questions about choice and reﬁning economic
methods so that they could be applied to schools.
In contrast, many other commentators on education found that they
could not make much headway against the questions that arose in a typical
debate on choice. Discussions often ended with the participants more con-
fused than they were initially. As a result, many commentators abandoned
the idea of trying to ﬁnd analytic answers to questions about choice and de-
cided instead that it was essentially a matter of principle. Unfortunately,
when commentators view school choice purely as a matter of principle,
their positions (of support or opposition) tend to become hardened. Con-
sensus is unlikely to grow.
Let us consider some of the tools—or, more properly, areas of familiar-
ity—that economists bring to the analysis of school choice. This exercise is
not merely a justiﬁcation of economic analysis. It is the way to see where the
confusions arise in school choice debates, and how it is that research (like
that contained in this volume) clariﬁes them.
Market Structure Makes the Diﬀerence
If school choice makes a diﬀerence (good or bad), it will be because it
changes the structureof the market for K-12 education. When one says that
school choice aﬀects market structure, one means that it aﬀects basic con-
straints that schools and students face. For instance, choice makes it easier
for students to be mobile among schools, and choice often makes a school’s
revenue directly dependent on its attracting students.
Introduction 3There are two reasons why it is important that an analyst of school choice
be comfortable with markets. First, we need to understand how market
structure aﬀects how market participants (schools and students) behave
and how, in turn, their behavior aﬀects outcomes (achievement, school pro-
ductivity, and so on). This relationship is often summarized in a phrase fa-
miliar to every economist: “structure, conduct, performance.” Understand-
ing this relationship is important because we can usually describe how a
school choice program aﬀects market structure. If an analyst is good at re-
ducing a program to its eﬀects on market structure and knows how to pre-
dict the results of that structure, he can make signiﬁcant progress.
People who are not able to reduce a school choice plan to its eﬀects on
market structure tend to get distracted by its superﬁcial details—the trans-
portation plan, the school buildings currently in use, and so on. They do not
distinguish between local idiosyncrasies and phenomena that are systemi-
cally aﬀected by the choice program, and therefore their analysis gets
bogged down.
The second reason why it is important that an analyst of school choice be
comfortable with markets is that he must, at a minimum, be opento the idea
that market forces matter—that is, that people may alter their behavior in
response to the pressures and incentives that the market generates. Econo-
mists are open to this idea. Although economists may not share the same
prior beliefs about the degree to which people respond to market forces,
they do share the belief that the degree of response ought to be measured.
Many noneconomists in the educational sector assume that market forces
do not aﬀect educators or students. Sometimes this assumption is a matter
of principle: It is ignoble to describe market forces in education, let alone
measure them. In other cases, this assumption stems from a belief that only
for-proﬁt ﬁrms respond to market forces. Economists have a long acquain-
tance with governments, individuals, and nonproﬁt organizations respond-
ing to market forces, and therefore they do not dismiss the task of measur-
ing their responses.
It Helps to Call a Spade a Spade
In some localities, the idea of school choice is more popular with the
public than it is with interest groups in the education sector. As a result, one
often sees programs that include “choice” in their title but that contain few
elements that are recognizable as choice. Even more confusingly, many
Americans have grown accustomed to the idea that traditional public
schools are wholly public (in the sense of being equally open to all people)
when, in fact, the traditional system contains some strong market elements.
Discrepancies between the nomenclature and the reality confuse many
would-be analysts of school choice.
Because economists focus on how school choice programs aﬀect market
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that when no money follows a student, they should expect diﬀerent out-
comes than when money does follow a student. They know that a program
in which schools are not allowed to contract or expand, to enter or exit, is
diﬀerent from one in which the suppliers of schooling are elastic. They
know to look at the constraints that a school faces, rather than whether it is
called “public,” “private,” “charter,” “community,” “magnet,” or something
else. In short, economists eliminate myriad sources of confusion by know-
ing how to extract the market structure from the description of a school sys-
tem (whether or not its name includes the word “choice”).
One Cannot Avoid the Interdependence of School Choice 
and School Finance, so One Might as Well Enjoy It
Every school choice program contains provisions about money. For in-
stance, voucher amounts must be set in some fashion and must be funded
by some stream of revenue. Charter schools receive a per-student fee that
must be related in some fashion to local per-pupil spending.
Thus, school choice inevitably intersects with school ﬁnance, which is the
study of (a) how school districts spend and raise property taxes and other
sources of revenue, (b) how state and federal aid aﬀects school districts’ rev-
enues and expenditures, and (c) the relationship between property tax rates
and property tax revenue. This intersection is dreaded by many education
policymakers, whose eyes glaze over at the thought of learning more about
taxes than they need to know in order to avoid being audited. As a result, ﬁ-
nancing is sometimes only an afterthought (and often a poorly designed
afterthought) in school choice plans.
In contrast, economists are not only not repelled by the school ﬁnance is-
sues implicit in school choice; they are actively drawn to the intersection be-
tween school choice and school ﬁnance. The intersection interests econo-
mists because school choice makes it possible to fund students at an
individual level and to fund schools ﬂexibly. That is, choice expands the set
of financial instruments that are available to fulfill the goals of school fi-
nance. Nowhere has economic analysis been more productive than at the
intersection of school ﬁnance and school choice.
School Choice Is More Interesting to People Who 
Are Puzzled by the Ineﬃcacy of School Inputs
The man on the street thinks that it is obvious that a school with more re-
sources—higher per-pupil spending or smaller classes, say—will produce
higher achievement. In fact, an examination of school data shows that this
is far from obvious. There are literally thousands of economic studies that
attempt to estimate “education production functions”—that is, the rela-
Introduction 5tionship between school inputs and outputs (student achievement). For at
least the past thirty years, since the 1966 publication of the inﬂuential Cole-
man Report,4 these attempts have focused on the question of whether there
is any relationship at all. The measured productivity of school inputs is so
low, even by the most optimistic estimates, that it would greatly shock the
man on the street. For instance, the most optimistic widely accepted esti-
mates of the eﬀect of class size reduction suggest that lowering class size by
10 percent (approximately two students) for all the years that a student is in
elementary school raises his or her achievement by 0.17 of a standard devi-
ation.5 Because the man on the street is ignorant of such facts, he remains
unpuzzled. In contrast, economists are impatient to solve the puzzle of why
money does not matter more in schools.
The lack of market forces in education is one of the most promising po-
tential explanations of the puzzle that has yet been put forward. After all,
market pressures are generally credited with stimulating ﬁrms to be pro-
ductive. Thus, it is natural that economists are interested in the productiv-
ity consequences of choice: They know that there is a puzzle to solved, and
they know that market pressures are a potential solution that is worth un-
derstanding.
You Cannot Predict the Eﬀects of School Choice on Student 
Sorting Without the Tools of General Equilibrium
The most complicated eﬀects of choice are on student sorting—how stu-
dents will allocate themselves among schools when allowed to choose
schools more freely. In popular parlance, such issues are described as
“cream-skimming” or segregation, even though these are only two forms of
student sorting that could arise. Debates about choice often run aground on
such issues, because opponents and proponents ﬁnd themselves getting
confused about how choice would aﬀect student sorting. Even if debaters
do not admit to being confused, they ﬁnd it hard to explain the logic behind
their assertions that a certain type of cream-skimming or segregation will
occur.
It is natural that confusion occurs. In fact, it is impossible to predict the
eﬀects of choice on student sorting without
• knowing numerous parameters about households and schools, such as
how a child’s achievement is aﬀected by his peers and what the eﬃcient
scale is for producing education with various types of children, such as
disabled, limited English proﬁcient, or gifted students;
6 Caroline M. Hoxby
4. The report that is generally known as the Coleman Report is Coleman et al. (1966).
5. The estimates described come from Alan Krueger (1999). Other modern, credible re-
search ﬁnds no eﬀect of class size reduction: See Hoxby (2000) and the review by Eric Hanu-
shek (1996).• having an accurate characterization of currentstudent sorting, which is
very strong in most metropolitan areas;
• having tools for ﬁnding equilibria in which students will be allocated to
schools in a stable way. This is a general equilibrium problem that re-
quires simultaneously solving for three equilibria: equilibrium in the
market for schooling, equilibrium in the market for housing, and equi-
librium in the labor market (solving for the income distribution). In
practice, a combination of closed-form proofs, simulations, and com-
putable general equilibrium techniques are required.
It goes without saying that the typical commentators on school choice
lack all of these requirements for understanding student sorting. Moreover,
they often do not realize that they lack them, and thus do not even try to ac-
quire what they need in order to answer questions about student sorting.
Economists attempt to fulﬁll the ﬁrst of these requirements by making a
variety of assumptions about the parameters and obtaining a correspon-
ding variety of predictions about student sorting. Empirical economists can
supply some of the information for the second requirement, although the
other information remains obscure because schools do not keep much data
on their students’ backgrounds. Economic theorists are girded with the gen-
eral equilibrium tools listed in the third requirement, although these tools
are often seriously strained by the complexities of the student sorting prob-
lem.
It would be optimistic to say that economists will soon be able to predict
the student sorting consequences of any proposed school choice plan. Our
theoretical machinery is too crude to incorporate the actual complexity of
households, schools, and housing markets, especially because the informa-
tion fed into the machinery falls far short of what is needed. Nevertheless,
compared to the typical commentator on school choice, economists have
made signiﬁcant strides on the student sorting problem: They grasp the
structure of the problem, they understand what information they need in
order to proceed, and they have some idea of how variousthe plausible out-
comes are. Economists can at least maintain a proper sense of humility
about predicting how school choice will aﬀect student sorting.
School Choice Will Aﬀect Labor Markets for Educators
In a discussion of school choice, it is common to hear one of the follow-
ing protests: “Teachers in my district cannot be paid that way. It is not in
their contract”; “Teachers cannot be paid that much: A lot of the budget
has to be spent on other staﬀ”; “Voters in my area will not support teacher
salaries that are that high”; “Administrators in my district do not get to
make that kind of hiring (ﬁring) decision. Their decisions are constrained
by the union”; or “Good teachers in my area leave the profession quickly.
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ment).” Such protests often bring a discussion of school choice to a halt, as
participants shake their heads over the labor market for educators.
All such protests are excessively rigid when school choice is the issue. The
market for educators is an upstream market (a provider of inputs) for the
market for schooling. Anything that fundamentally changes the structure
of the market for schooling, as school choice can, can deeply aﬀect the way
its upstream markets function. Indeed, the typical protests reﬂectthe struc-
ture of the current market for schooling; they are not preconditions to
which it is subject. For example, the salaries that parents are willing to pay
reﬂect their satisfaction with schools, and choice generally gives schools
stronger incentives to satisfy parents.
Analyzing how a change in market structure aﬀects upstream markets is
a classic problem in economics. Thus, not only are economists not stymied
by protests like those listed above; they can borrow experience from other
sectors in which upstream labor markets changed in response to down-
stream market structure. Such experience is not derived exclusively from
for-proﬁt industries. Much recent experience comes from industries that in-
clude not-for-proﬁt and government providers, like health care.
In fact, analysis of how choice would change the market for teachers is al-
ready in progress: Hanushek and Rivkin present some results in their chap-
ter, and I have published a study focusing exclusively on how choice has
aﬀected the teaching profession (see Hoxby 2002).
Evidence on School Choice Requires the Latest 
Methods in Nonexperimental Empirical Analysis
As a rule, it is impossible to conduct controlled, double-blind experi-
ments on schoolchildren, primarily because it is considered unethical to ex-
periment on them. That is, if the policy under consideration is considered
likely to be beneﬁcial, then it is considered unethical to allow some children
to experience the policy while forbidding it to others. Furthermore, con-
trolled, double-blind experiments are impractical in many cases. It would
be impossible, for instance, to let some families exercise school choice and
forbid other families to exercise it but to keep them blind about the group
to which they had been assigned (or even to keep schools ignorant of the
families’ group assignments). In addition, if we were to allow only some
families to exercise school choice (keeping others in the control group), we
could not observe some of the eﬀects of a full-blown school choice program.
For instance, the labor market for educators might not change much if ed-
ucators could easily avoid being in a choice school (by working at a control
school).
The lack of a laboratory-like experimental setting is nothing new to econ-
omists, given that they cannot experiment on workers, the unemployed,
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ticularly over the last thirty years, economists have worked intensely to
develop statistical techniques for analyzing policies in nonexperimental
settings. Empirical economists now have methods for exploiting policy
enactments (“policy experiments”) and accidental policy changes (“natural
experiments”). These methods work because they extract from the real
world those events that most closely mimic the controlled setting of a labo-
ratory experiment. Economists are acutely aware of problems like selection
(the families who use a school choice program may be diﬀerent from those
who do not), policy endogeneity (school choice policies may be enacted in
response to problems that continue to aﬀect students after enactment), and
the inadequacies of partial equilibrium analysis (the eﬀect of a choice plan
in which only a fraction of students can participate may diﬀer from the
eﬀect of one in which all students can participate).
Given the rapid improvement in these techniques during the 1980s and
early 1990s, the school choice debate could not have arisen at a better time
for empirical economists. Put another way, it is a quirk of timing that has
made economists (and others using their methods) the best empirical ana-
lysts of school choice: When the need for analysis arose, they were simply
the most experienced users of the right tools for the job.
It Is Important to Know Which Students Are 
Likely to Be Aﬀected by School Choice
The current make-up of private schools is a source of considerable con-
fusion in school choice debates. Children who currently attend private
schools belong to several diverse groups: central city children who attend
inexpensive schools that are charitably subsidized by a religious denomina-
tion (such as the Roman Catholic church) to which most of the children do
not belong; suburban children who attend private schools that are aﬃliated
with their own religious group; disabled children who attend private schools
that cater to their special needs; and children of aﬄuent parents who attend
college preparatory schools. The ﬁrst two groups account for approximately
85 percent of private school students in the United States.
There are two things to note about all of these students. First, they are by
deﬁnition not constrained to attend the public school to which they would
otherwise be assigned. Second, they are unusual. Central city private school
students are unusual because they are children who have had the good for-
tune to land one of the highly rationed places in a subsidized nonpublic
school. Places in such schools are not rationed on tuition (that is, such
schools would be glad to oﬀer more school places if the marginal students
could pay tuition equal to the per-pupil costs). Instead, such schools main-
tain low tuition in order to remain accessible to poor families, and they dis-
tribute their limited places on relatively arbitrary bases, such as “ﬁrst come,
Introduction 9ﬁrst served.” The second group of students is unusual because they come
from families who place so much weight on religious education that they are
willing to make considerable ﬁnancial sacriﬁces for it. Not only do they pay
tuition on top of paying taxes for public schools that their children do not
use, but their private schools also spend only about half of what their public
schools spend (and their children consequently experience fewer ameni-
ties). The third group—disabled students—is obviously unusual, and the
fourth group (which makes up only about 1 percent of American K-12 en-
rollment) is unusual because the vast majority of aﬄuent parents simply live
in an aﬄuent area and send their children to a school that is public but nev-
ertheless caters almost exclusively to people like them.
Many commentators, when attempting to envision a world with school
choice, turn to the current private school sector for illumination, and they
predict that children like those described above will be the children who are
most aﬀected by choice.
Economists, in contrast, understand that what choice programs do is re-
lax constraints on students’ mobility among schools. Therefore, the stu-
dents who will be most aﬀected by choice are those for whom the current
constraints are most binding. None of the students described above ﬁt into
this category, since they have already overcome the constraints that would
be relaxed by school choice. (This is not to say that they would be unaﬀected
by  choice, since school choice could change the availability of private
schools.) Economists, therefore, focus on students who are currently con-
strained to attend a school that unconstrained families avoid. Economists
also focus on students who live in an area that can support multiple schools
(since allowing a rural student to choose a school that is far away is not a
meaningful relaxation of constraints). Thus, the students who are most
likely to be aﬀected by choice are urban students who (a) are either suﬃ-
ciently poor or suﬃciently discriminated against that their parents are con-
strained to live where the schools are unappealing, and (b) are too poor to
pay tuition equal to some private school’s per-pupil costs.
School Choice Is All about School Supply
The school choice debate is also plagued by confusion about the supply
of schools of choice. A common misapprehension is that, under school
choice, students would have to be allocated among each existing school’s
current number of places. Another common misapprehension is that, un-
der a voucher program that allowed religious private schools to accept
vouchers, approximately 85 percent of private school enrollment would be
in religious schools because that is the current composition of private
schools. Such misapprehensions stem from the belief that the supply of
schooling is inelastic.
Economists realize that such an assumption is extreme and very unlikely
10 Caroline M. Hoxbyto be true. In every sector, there are factors that determine supply, and econ-
omists know that understanding such factors is the key to predicting supply
accurately. Economists focus on factors that would determine what the
supply of schools would look like under choice: the cost of school inputs,
economies of scale, and the features on which parents are willing to spend
their vouchers.
For example, it is useful to know how much it costs to build new schools
and how much it costs to refurbish current schools so that they can be used
for reorganized or new schools. Those who believe that the supply of
schools is inelastic apparently believe that such costs are prohibitively high.
They are not, as is demonstrated by the ability of school management com-
panies that now routinely build new schools and renovate current schools
for their use (Edison Schools, Advantage Schools, etc.). Moreover, many
school inputs are in elastic supply and can be purchased at a price that can
be readily established: classroom equipment, school accounting software,
computers, and so on. There are numerous economic studies of how the
quantity and quality of teachers responds to salaries and beneﬁts, and we
can use estimates from such studies.
If we wish to understand what the supply of schools would look like un-
der choice, it is also useful to know the preferences of the parents who are
most bound by the constraints that a school choice program would relax.
For instance, unless constrained parents have a great taste for religious ed-
ucation, it is unlikely that the supply of choice schools would end up being
dominated by schools with religious aﬃliation. In short, current private
school parents have unusual tastes, so their preferences tell us little about
the preferences of future choice parents. Economists realize that it is more
useful to examine the stated preferences, from the National Household Ed-
ucation Survey or opinion surveys, of parents who are likely to be con-
strained. Such survey evidence is imperfect, but it is a better guide to future
supply than are the preferences of current private school parents.
It Is the Threat of Competition That Matters
Part of understanding markets is understanding that the schools’ con-
duct and performance will depend on the availability of alternative schools,
not on whether the parents actually use the alternatives. That is, it is the
threat of competition that matters, not whether the threat results in (a) the
incumbent school’s improving so much that parents do not want to use
the alternative school or (b) parents’ leaving the incumbent school for a
better alternative.
There are two important implications of realizing that it is the threat of
competition that matters. First, if we observe a public school that loses
many students to choice schools (voucher, charter, and private schools), we
should realize that the school faces competition andis responding poorly to
Introduction 11it. A similar school that loses few students to choice schools is not necessary
facing less competition: It may just be responding better. Therefore, cross-
sectional comparison of schools that do and do not lose students to choice
schools is not good evidence about the eﬀects of competition. What one
needs to do, in order to obtain evidence on competition, is ﬁnd schools that
are and are not subjected to the threat of competition. Economists under-
stand the distinction (between the threat of competition and actual loss of
students) and can design an empirical study of the threat of competition.
Second, once we recognize that it is the threat of competition that mat-
ters, we see that students who do not attend choice schools may beneﬁt from
competition just as much as students who do. Indeed, if we want to know
whether choice matters, then students at seriously threatened incumbent
schools are not a good control group for students at choice schools.
Insights from the Chapters That Follow
Each of the chapters in this volume takes up a diﬀerent aspect of school
choice and is the culmination of a research agenda. As a result, reading each
chapter is like opening a door into a body of research. The authors them-
selves are the best guides to their particular areas, and the authors are cer-
tainly best at presenting their own results. Therefore, I will not attempt to
summarize their chapters here but will use this opportunity to draw atten-
tion to insights and features of each chapter that I found to be particularly
striking.
Eric A. Hanushek and Steven G. Rivkin, in “Does Public School Com-
petition Aﬀect Teacher Quality?” explore the hypothesis that choice will
force schools to employ teachers of a more consistent, high quality. The
study is central to the question of how choice (the structure of the down-
stream market for education) will aﬀect teaching (the key upstream mar-
ket). Ordinarily, teacher quality is very diﬃcult to measure. For instance, in
a related study, I had to use the selectivity of a teacher’s college and whether
a teacher had a subject-area degree as proxies for quality. Hanushek and
Rivkin, however, are able to measure a teacher’s quality by his or her sys-
tematic eﬀect on student achievement. Their clever empirical strategy re-
quires very detailed and complete data, which they have obtained for the
entire state of Texas.
Hanushek and Rivkin exploit variation in the most common, traditional
form of public school choice: parents’ choosing among schools by choosing
where to live. Two interesting insights arise in relation to this strategy. First,
the evidence suggests that, although both choice among schools (within a
district) and choice among districts are meaningful, they are not the same.
When parents choose a district, there are ﬁnancial implications of their
choice because districts are ﬁnancially autonomous and depend on local
property values. When parents choose a school within a district, their
12 Caroline M. Hoxbychoice does not have the same implications. Second, the Texas data clearly
show that choice is more meaningful for metropolitan students than for ru-
ral students.
David N. Figlio and Marianne E. Page’s chapter, “Can School Choice
and School Accountability Successfully Coexist?” examines Florida’s
voucher system, in which students are oﬀered vouchers if they attend a
school that consistently fails to meet Florida’s achievement standards. Pro-
posals for similar programs (in which choice is limited to students who
would otherwise attend failing schools) enjoy considerable political popu-
larity. 
Figlio and Page’s study exposes a fundamental diﬀerence between such
choice programs and more conventional programs in which eligibility is
based mainly on students’ own characteristics (not his school’s failure).
Conventional choice programs rely on the idea that parents are inclined to
choose better schools for their children when they can. Thus, conventional
programs attempt to make escape easier for parents who are currently con-
strained (by their incomes, job locations, or other factors) to choose a bad
school. Conventional programs often include provisions that increase the
information available to parents, in the form of school report cards and so
on. Nevertheless, choice plans usually depend on parents to ﬁlter and judge
the information they receive about schools, and parents are the main source
of discipline for underperforming schools.
In contrast, the Florida program relies on the idea that the state is better
than parents at determining whether a school is underperforming. In the
Florida program, a school’s being attractive to parents is no guarantee
against state sanctions, nor is a school’s being unattractive to parents a
guarantee of vouchers. Figlio and Page demonstrate empirically that the
Florida system, regardless of whether it depends on achievement levels or
value-added measures of achievement, does not give vouchers to many stu-
dents who are currently constrained and does give vouchers to many stu-
dents who are currently unconstrained. A deep inconsistency in the Florida
program is that its success depends on parents’ using the vouchers wisely,
even though its structure implies that parents are poor judges of schools
compared to the state.
In short, Figlio and Page’s paper should make us think carefully about
the fundamental claims on which choice programs are justiﬁed. Their paper
is a wake-up call for people who ignore diﬀerences between Florida-style
and conventional choice programs.
Julie Berry Cullen and Steven G. Rivkin study the ticklish intersection
between school choice and special education in their chapter, “The Role of
Special Education in School Choice.” The authors bring to light several im-
portant questions about school choice and special education. Can a choice
program ensure that all (or most) schools have the resources to fulﬁll a stu-
dent’s individual education plan (IEP)? If the answer is no, then special ed-
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will attempt to exclude them or because they themselves will stay away from
schools that do not have adequate resources. Also, would other students at-
tempt to avoid special education students in a system with greater choice?
Using data from the Texas public school system, the authors conclude
that there is little evidence that regular education students attempt to avoid
special education students. However, the data do suggest that special edu-
cation students are disproportionately likely to make use of opportunities
to choose among public schools. Moreover, special education students al-
ready use private school vouchers in a number of states. Thus, one of the key
things that we learn from Cullen and Rivkin is that choice does not merely
generate unique risks for special education students; it also presents them
with unique opportunities.
The authors’ results lead them to ask, “In a system of school choice, who
should decide what a student’s IEP is?” Cullen and Rivkin show that spe-
cial education families value school choice because it allows them to seek
not only sympathetic environments for their children, but also the IEP that
they feel is appropriate. This is the positive side of IEP seeking. Cullen and
Rivkin also suggest that some IEP seeking may be less positive: A family
may switch schools until it ﬁnds an administrator whom it can bully into
writing an inappropriate IEP for its child. Moreover, Cullen and Rivkin in-
form us that, empirically, it appears that schools already over- or under-
classify students in response to ﬁnancial incentives to do so. Gaming of the
system can be exacerbated by a poorly designed choice program. For in-
stance, the authors describe Minnesota’s open enrollment plan, in which re-
ceiving schools were inclined to overclassify students because the sending
schools were responsible for paying the costs of the IEP. Designers of choice
plans will come away from the Cullen and Rivkin chapter with many ideas
about how to (and how not to) design the special education provision of
their programs.
Paul E. Peterson, William G. Howell, Patrick J. Wolf, and David E.
Campbell compare the outcomes of students who are randomly given and
not given vouchers in “School Vouchers: Results from Randomized Exper-
iments.” The randomization occurs when applicants for vouchers put their
names into lotteries, because the number of available vouchers is fewer than
the number of applicants. The randomized design has features that are ob-
viously desirable. In particular, it is extremely plausible that the randomly
selected “treatment” and “control” groups of students have similar unob-
served characteristics. Because we cannot check students’ unobserved char-
acteristics, it is valuable to have a design that guarantees similarity to the
maximum extent possible.
Readers will naturally want to focus on Peterson et al.’s comparison of the
standardized test achievement of voucher and control students. In this
chapter, the authors describe these results for several voucher programs, all
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look further than the achievement results, because Peterson et al.’s data are
rich on other dimensions. We can derive what anthropologists call a “thick
description” of the entire voucher experience.
For instance, we learn that younger children adjust more readily to
voucher schools and consequently improve their achievement more quickly
after the choice opportunity is made available to them. Older children are
more likely to complain about tough new discipline or academic demands,
at least in the immediate aftermath of the transition. (As we might expect,
the parents of older children do not always share their children’s dissatis-
faction.)
A large share of the students in Peterson et al.’s data are black, owing to
the location and eligibility criteria of the programs that they study. Thus, the
results for white students are less precise than they are for black students,
and we should be circumspect about interpreting diﬀerences between the
black students’ and white students’ results. Nevertheless, the data suggest
that black students beneﬁt more from vouchers, perhaps because black
families are more constrained without choice (they are poorer or have more
limited housing choices) or because black students suﬀer from more dis-
crimination in public schools than in voucher schools. These results are in-
triguing and suggest leads for unraveling the puzzle of America’s signiﬁcant
black-white achievement gap.
Even with a randomized design, some empirical problems arise in Peter-
son’s study, and he shares his solutions to them. For instance, are the fami-
lies who apply for the vouchers very diﬀerent from nonapplicants? The ran-
domized design does not have a natural way of comparing applicants to
nonapplicants. Peterson et al. solve this problem with additional data,
which they gathered through representative surveys of local families. An-
other tricky question is what to do about families who win vouchers but do
not use them. After all, the randomization is only over voucher receipt, not
voucher use. Instrumenting for voucher use with voucher receipt allows Pe-
terson et al. to recover an unbiased estimate of the eﬀect of voucher use—
that is, the eﬀect of voucher use uncontaminated by biases that might creep
in if a certain type of families were more likely to leave the voucher unused.
The inclusion of Peterson et al.’s study in this volume deserves special
comment, not because Peterson is a political scientist (which is unimpor-
tant, given that he uses modern econometrics), but because economists’ ini-
tial response to a study like this one is nearly always, “Why are such studies
needed at all?” Economists reason that if parents use the vouchers (when
they could easily continue to use the public schools or return to the public
schools), then it is obvious that “treatment” parents are more satisﬁed than
they would otherwise have been. Is not it obvious that their children are do-
ing better, in some parentally deﬁned sense if not in terms of standardized
tests? That is, economists tend to take a revealed preference view: They are
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(when another is freely available) as they are to believe that families will
shop at their less-preferred grocery store. In addition, economists wonder
how to use the study’s results: They are disinclined to extrapolate from some
voucher schools to allpotential voucher schools—just as they would be dis-
inclined to say that all grocery stores are preferred to A&P just because cer-
tain grocery stores are preferred to A&P in some localities. Finally, econo-
mists are loath to believe that families can be made worse oﬀ when they are
given an option that they did not have before, except when their default
public school deteriorates because other families were given the option to
leave it too. (The possibility of such deterioration is the reason why econo-
mists are interested in how choice aﬀects student sorting and school ﬁ-
nance.) Since Peterson et al. examine voucher programs that are tiny rela-
tive to the public school systems from which they draw students, it is very
unlikely that the families’ default public schools could deteriorate signiﬁ-
cantly because of the voucher program. Thus, economists reason, families
cannot be made worse oﬀ in the situations that Peterson et al. study.
Given economists’ initial reactions to studies like Peterson et al.’s, why do
they return again and again to such studies, and where do such studies be-
long in the economic analysis of choice? The answer is that Peterson et al.’s
study helps us to learn about fundamentalparameters that are necessary for
predicting the response to school choice. For instance, commentators on
education sometimes doubt whether parents—especially central city, poor
parents—take achievement into account at all when they judge a school.
Commentators often suggest that poor parents are drawn to schools mainly
on the basis of ethnic concerns (they like ethnocentric curricula regardless
of the eﬀect on achievement), laziness (they choose whatever school mini-
mizes their eﬀort), or superﬁcial attributes (they like attractive uniforms).
Not only does Peterson et al.’s study allow us to estimate how much parents
seek achievement when they make school choices, but the study also gives
us a relatively rich picture of the families whose behavior will be important
in a choice environment.
A ﬁnal note on Peterson et al.’s analysis is in order. It is not subject to the
criticism, mentioned above, that students at incumbent schools are invalid
control students because their schools may be aﬀected by the threat of com-
petition, even if they do not exercise choice. The voucher programs that Pe-
terson et al. study enroll just a few percent of local students, and they are
privately funded (so the public schools do not lose any money when they
lose a student). Thus, the incumbent schools attended by the control stu-
dents are unlikely be signiﬁcantly changed by the voucher programs.
Thomas J. Nechyba, in “Introducing School Choice into Multidistrict
Public School Systems,” demonstrates how important it is to model the cur-
rent school system realistically before attempting to predict the eﬀects of
school choice. Nechyba manages to reduce the complexity of the current
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people simultaneously choose their public school district and residence and
whether to send their children to private schools. Voters of each school dis-
trict choose the level at which their schools will be funded, with the tax base
being the property they actually own. In short, he manages to incorporate
a housing market, private schools, and political economy in a tractable
model. He uses data from actual school districts to bound the parameters
for his model.
Nechyba emphasizes that the current system pressures families to live in
school districts with other families who have similar demand for housing
(in other words, similar incomes). This force is responsible for much of the
inequality in school spending that we see in the current system. Vouchers
sever the link between housing and schooling, and thereby reduce the in-
centive for families to segregate themselves on the basis of income. For in-
stance, well-oﬀ couples who currently leave the central city for the suburbs
as soon as they have school-aged children would be more likely to remain
under a voucher program. Nechyba demonstrates that, because vouchers
induce greater income integration, they do not raise the inequality of
schools’ resources much, if at all. He demonstrates how incorrect a com-
mentator’s predictions will be if he (the commentator) characterizes the cur-
rent system as an idealized system in which all public schools are equal and
no areas are segregated on the basis of income.
In a series of studies, Raquel Fernández and Richard Rogerson have ex-
amined how school ﬁnance aﬀects the growth and distribution of income in
a nation. Each of their studies has wrestled with the same fundamental
problem. The market for investments in human capital is ﬂawed because
little children do not borrow against their future earnings to ﬁnance the in-
vestment in education that would be optimal for them. (Little children can-
not borrow for several reasons. They are not competent to sign contracts
that would bind them for life to a schedule of repayments; their parents can-
not sign such contracts on their behalf; families know little about a child’s
abilities and about the future labor market; and human capital is not col-
lateral that could be repossessed by a lender if the borrower were to default
on his education loan.)
The ﬂawed market for human capital investments generates investments
that are systematically inadequate for certain groups, especially poor fami-
lies who are unable to provide internal (family) ﬁnancing of education. Such
inoptimal investment translates into slow growth for a country and unnec-
essary intergenerational transmission of economic status. Fernández and
Rogerson ﬁrst remind us of how well current school ﬁnance systems remedy
the market ﬂaws. They treat pure local ﬁnance as their benchmark, but they
also discuss some popular state aid systems. They go on to examine three
diﬀerent types of vouchers that would be straightforward to enact: lump-
sum vouchers (every student gets the same voucher), means-tested vouch-
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power-equalizing vouchers (every student with less than a certain income
gets a voucher that rises as his family’s income falls and as the share of his
family’s income that is devoted to schooling rises).
Using a calibrated theoretical model, Fernández and Rogerson demon-
strate that the vouchers, especially the power-equalizing vouchers, generate
large increases in a nation’s income and well-being. One key insight is that
vouchers, because they are speciﬁc to individual students (rather than en-
tire districts), generate more optimal investments in education than any ver-
sion of current school ﬁnance (which operates at the district level) could
generate.
Dennis Epple and Richard Romano, in “Neighborhood Schools, Choice,
and the Distribution of Educational Beneﬁts,” study intradistrict choice.
The distinctive feature of intradistrict choice is that there is no channel by
which a school gains per-pupil spending when it attracts a student (or loses
per-pupil spending when it loses a student). Intradistrict choice plans are
used in some large cities (for instance, Chicago). Some states, if they were to
adopt public school choice plans, would eﬀectively adopt intradistrict
plans: Hawaii has one school district for the entire state; California is ap-
proximately one district for ﬁnancial purposes; and a few other states (such
as New Mexico) allow very little variation in per-pupil spending among
their districts.
Epple and Romano compare intradistrict choice to typical neighbor-
hood schools, in which each student attends his assigned local school. They
demonstrate that there is an important trade-oﬀ between intradistrict
choice and neighborhood schools, so long as every student beneﬁts from be-
ing with students of higher ability (a crucial assumption). The trade-oﬀis as
follows: Intradistrict choice encourages segregation of students on the ba-
sis of ability, compared to neighborhood schools, but discourages segrega-
tion of students on the basis of income, compared to neighborhood schools.
Another insight to take away from Epple and Romano’s chapter is that
the eﬀects of intradistrict choice depend very much on whether surround-
ing districts use intradistrict choice too (or retain neighborhood schools)
and whether surrounding districts are close substitutes for the district with
intradistrict choice. For instance, if one district in the midst of many others
unilaterally enacts intradistrict choice, then well-oﬀ families who prefer to
send their child to an income-segregated neighborhood school will move
out of the district with intradistrict choice. The systematic departure of
such families will drive down per-pupil spending in the district with intra-
district choice.
In “School Choice and School Productivity: Could School Choice Be a
Tide That Lifts All Boats?” I begin by reviewing some facts that suggest that
American schools could be substantially more productive. (The productiv-
ity of schools is measured by dividing a standardized measure of students’
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ity of American schools has fallen by between 45 and 75 percent, depend-
ing on how one controls for changes in the sociodemographic composition
of the population and for the increased cost of hiring well-educated female
workers. Therefore, even if choice could make American schools recoup
only one-third or one-half of the productivity that they have recently lost,
then the productivity eﬀect might easily swamp other eﬀects of choice. For
instance, suppose that choice, through a channel like student sorting, has
negative eﬀects on some students’ peer groups. What we know about the
scale of peer eﬀects suggests that regaining half of the lost productivity
would easily outweigh such negative eﬀects.
In the chapter, I examine how three recent choice reforms aﬀected the
productivity of incumbent public schools. The three reforms (Milwaukee
vouchers, Michigan charter schools, and Arizona charter schools) were se-
lected because the number of eligible students and the fees associated with
them were large enough that incumbent public schools might begin to feel
threatened. I show that, as one would expect, the schools that lost students
under choice were schools that were underperforming when the choice pro-
grams were enacted. In fact, it appears that charter schools, which have
some discretion about where they will locate, picked locations at which they
would have access to a population of dissatisﬁed families.
I ﬁnd that incumbent schools reacted surprisingly quickly and positively
to the threat of competition. For instance, public schools in Milwaukee,
which began to be seriously threatened only in 1998–99, rose remarkably in
their test scores in ﬁrst two years they were threatened (with no relative in-
crease in spending), compared to similar, but unthreatened, public schools
elsewhere in Wisconsin. School superintendents sometimes claim that they
have a backlog of changes that need to be made, and that a serious com-
petitive threat allows them to make several changes at once. Because the
quick, large reactions may reﬂect such backlogs, the chapter also reviews ev-
idence of long-term productivity reactions to the availability of traditional
forms of choice (choosing a public school by choosing a residence and send-
ing a child to a regular private school).
Looking Forward
In the coming years, we can look forward to further advances in the eco-
nomic analysis of school choice. Empirical evidence will grow in proportion
to the enactment of reforms, and—fortunately for research—the number
and variety of charter school, voucher, and public school choice programs
are continually increasing. It would be particularly helpful, from the re-
search point of view, to have one state or one large metropolitan area enact
a choice plan that is both stable and relatively universal. Arizona’s charter
school program is the nearest approximation to this that we currently have,
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ditional forms of choice in order to get evidence on the long-term, general
equilibrium eﬀects of choice, such as the eﬀects on the market for teachers,
student sorting, residential segregation, school ﬁnance, and the housing
market.
There is a great deal of variation in the ﬁnancial arrangements of the ex-
perimental choice plans enacted over the past several years, but much of the
variation is not useful for empirical research. Many of the experimental
plans have ﬁnancial arrangements that are obviously unsuitable for full-
scale choice, and we can learn only a limited amount from them. The future
is brighter: The happy merger between research on school choice and
school ﬁnance is already leading to more thoughtful construction of the ﬁ-
nancial side of choice plans. As the plans get reﬁned, it will be easier for re-
searchers to learn about how choice changes the school ﬁnance environ-
ment.
We can learn from foreign school choice programs, as well as American
ones, but on this front, I am obliged to raise warning ﬂags as well as hopes.
Empirical evidence may be helpful if it comes from a foreign country that
has similar school ﬁnance, market orientation, and culture to those of the
United States, but very few countries fulﬁll one of these criteria, and no
foreign country fulﬁlls all the criteria. (Canada is the closest by far.) Some
research on foreign school choice assumes that the results will translate
readily to the United States. This is naïve. School choice plans are layered
on top of America’s current system of public and private schools, which is
an outlier in the world. American schools are more locally controlled,
more reliant on local funding, and more entwined with the housing mar-
ket (because of property tax revenue and Americans’ greater residential
mobility) than any other schools in the world. Inequality and disability ex-
ist everywhere, but America has a unique legal history regarding school de-
segregation and special education. In short, many of the questions that
arise in a typical American debate on school choice are peculiar to the
United States.
More importantly, school choice is fundamentally a market-based re-
form, and Americans have very diﬀerent experience with markets than
most people in the world. By world standards, Americans are conﬁdent
consumers who negotiate markets well but take dictation poorly from social
planners, even when the social planners are benevolent. In France, for in-
stance, an educational elite chooses the curriculum for the entire nation and
determines which students will be able to attend academic high schools and
college. This system may work well for the French, but Americans have con-
sistently resisted letting an elite group decide how their children should be
educated and which children deserve further education. That is, Americans
appear to like making choices about their children’s education. Also, the
American labor market is less regulated than other countries’. Typical
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motions are market-oriented (unless they have a strange lack of acquain-
tances among the nonunion, private-sector workers who make up most of
the workforce), but they would probably be shocked to learn that most for-
eign teachers are on nationwide contracts and are assigned to a school by a
national ministry. American teachers are already more market oriented
than their foreign counterparts and probably value their ability to change
their pay or working conditions by moving to a new district. In many other
countries, government provision of services and elite decisions about edu-
cation are not only more common, but they enjoy far stronger social sup-
port. It is poor inference to assume that, because foreign families or teach-
ers react in a certain way to a choice program, Americans will necessarily
react similarly. We will learn the most from research on foreign school
choice when we take the trouble to articulate and quantify the diﬀerences in
institutions and typical economic behavior.
I can return to a more optimistic tone with theoretical economic analysis
of school choice. On this front, there is little that constrains research from
continuing at a good rate of progress, except for the energy of researchers.
As a theory problem, school choice sits neatly at the intersection of several
ﬁelds: labor economics (because investment in education is a human capi-
tal problem), public economics (because schools must be financed), and
industrial organization (because schools must compete with one another
under choice). In addition, analysis of school choice draws upon general
equilibrium and overlapping generations models most often used by macro-
economists. We have not yet come close to exhausting existing tools’ ca-
pacity for analyzing school choice. However, nearly every existing tool was
initially designed for another purpose than the analysis of school choice,
and thus each tool must be modiﬁed to ﬁt American educational institu-
tions. Also, analysts ﬁnd themselves having to learn economics outside
their “home” ﬁeld. In short, although progress is very likely, it must proceed
at a somewhat measured pace.
Theory is likely to advance, especially along the lines of optimal design
of choice programs. In the ﬁrst years of analysis, economists were (not sur-
prisingly) absorbed in analyzing existing choice plans or proposals. Such
analysis led to greater understanding of the issues, but the natural conse-
quence of such understanding was that economists began to envision pro-
grams that dealt better with choice problems than existing programs do.
Design of more optimal programs is a productive agenda, and recent papers
(including the one by Fernández and Rogerson in this volume) illustrate its
usefulness. We are just beginning to explore the potential of school choice
to solve long-standing problems in school ﬁnance, racial and income segre-
gation, and special education. We will continue to learn about the risks of
school choice and its capacity to make schools more eﬀective and to match
students better to schools.
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